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Abstract: Lightweight bytecode verification uses stack maps to annotate Java bytecode
programs with type information so that the checker only has to validate this typing, without
having to do any data flow analysis. This report describes an improved analysis technique
together with algorithms for optimizing the stack maps generated by the analyser. The
improved analyser is based on a modified version of the abstract domain. This domain is
simplified in its treatment of base values, keeping only the necessary information to ensure
the memory safety property. It is richer in its representation of interface types, using the
known Dedekind-MacNeille completion technique to construct abstract domain elements
representing sets of interfaces. Tracking interface information allows to remove the dynamic
checks at interface method invocations. We prove the memory safety property guaranteed
by the verifier using an operational semantics whose distinguishing feature is a low-level
memory model operating on untagged 32-bit values, as opposed to the standard, higher-
level memory models using tagged base values. For bytecode that is typable without sets
of types (this includes any code compiled from Java) we show how to prune the fix-point
to obtain a stack map that can be validated without the interface set computations arising
from this extension. In the context of lightweight verification, this is an advantage as it does
not make the checking more complex or costly. The size of the stack maps is not significantly
modified. Experiments show that the pruning can be done by reasonably efficient (though
in theory exponential) algorithms that uses heuristics to explore the space of valid program
typings from the least fixpoint generated by the analyser. Stack maps for three substantial
test suites were correctly handled by the optimized (but incomplete) pruning algorithm.
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Calcul de certificats avec interfaces
Re´sume´ : La ve´rification de bytecode “lightweight” utilise des certificats pour anot-
ter les programmes en bytecode Java avec une information de type, de telle sorte que le
verifieur de bytecode n’ait plus qu’a` ve´rifier ce typage, sans avoir besoin de faire une quel-
conque analyse de flot de donne´es. Nous de´crivons une technique de ve´rification ame´liore´e,
couple´e a` des algorithmes qui optimisent les certificats ge´ne´re´s par l’analyseur. L’analyseur
ame´liore´ est fonde´ sur une version modifie´e du domaine abstrait pour la ve´rification de
bytecode. Ce domaine est simplifie´ en ce qui concerne le traitement des valeurs de base,
et conserve seulement l’information ne´cessaire pour assurer la proprie´te´ de suˆrete´ me´moire.
Il est plus riche dans sa repre´sentation des types interfaces, utilisant la technique connue
de comple´tion de Dedekind-MacNeille pour construire des e´le´ments du domaine abstrait
qui repre´sentent des ensembles d’interfaces. La ve´rification des interfaces permet de sup-
primer les controˆles dynamiques lors des appels de me´thodes d’interfaces. Nous prouvons
que la proprie´te´ de suˆrete´ me´moire garantie par le ve´rifieur est assure´e, en utilisant une
se´mantique ope´rationnelle qui se distingue par un mode`le de la me´moire bas niveau ope´rant
sur des valeurs de 32 bits non annote´es, contrairement aux mode`les me´moire standard, de
plus haut niveau, qui utilisent des objects me´moires annote´s. Pour du bytecode pouvant
eˆtre type´ sans recourir a` des ensembles de types (ce qui inclut tout bytecode compile´ a`
partir de Java), nous montrons comment e´laguer le point-fixe pour obtenir un certificat qui
peut eˆtre valide´ sans les calculs sur des ensembles d’interfaces qui surviennent a` cause de
cette extension. Dans le contexte de la ve´rification “lightweight”, c’est un avantage puisque
cela ne rend pas la validation plus complique´e ou couˆteuse. La taille des certificat n’est
pas modifie´e de fac¸on significative. L’expe´rience montre que l’e´lagage peut eˆtre effectue´ par
des algorithmes raisonnablement efficaces (bien qu’exponentiels en the´orie) qui utilisent des
heuristiques pour explorer l’espace des typages valides d’un programme en partant du plus
petit point-fixe ge´ne´re´ par l’analyseur. Les certificats pour trois suites de tests conse´quentes
ont tous e´te´ correctement traite´s par l’algorithme d’e´lagage optimise´ (mais incomplet).
Mots cle´s : Ve´rification de bytecode, suˆrete´ me´moire, e´lagage, interpre´tation abstraite
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1 Introduction
The Java bytecode verifier, which is part of the Java Virtual Machine [LY99] is a central
component in Java security. It contains the static part of the safety checks that are performed
on bytecode to ensure that it is “safe”, in the sense that its execution conforms to a set of
rules that entail that the program can only interact with its environment through the well-
defined interface of invoking methods and reading or modifying objects. Together with the
access control that is performed dynamically with these actions, and with the security policy
that underlies the available API, this makes possible to execute untrusted bytecode without
risk, for example web applets or mobile phone midlets.
While the standard bytecode verifier performs a dataflow analysis on the bytecode by
fix-point iteration, the lightweight bytecode verifier [BLTY03] only checks a fix-point (which
is called a stack map) that is shipped with the bytecode. It was originally designed for
resource-constrained devices but the mainstream Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) is now
moving to this kind of verification, and Java 6 uses a lightweight bytecode verifier with
slightly enhanced stack maps (see JSR 202 [JSR06]). This is an instance of the more general
Proof Carrying Code [Nec97] paradigm.
A particular issue for the type inference performed by in bytecode verification is the
possibility for a class to implement several interfaces. The problem arises as soon as the
language has multiple inheritance (only for interfaces, in the case of Java). This implies
that the type hierarchy is not a lattice and prevents the computation of a unique most
precise type for some variables, unless using sets of types. For simplicity, the choice made
in the original verifiers (both standard and lightweight) was to ignore interfaces in bytecode
verification and to make the necessary checks dynamically. This choice has been maintained
in JSR 202.
We propose to extend the bytecode analysis to check interfaces statically, using con-
junctions of types, and then to prune the result in order to obtain a stack map without
conjunctions that can be fed to an almost unmodified checker. This technique does not
work for every possible Java bytecode, but it applies to any bytecode obtained by compi-
lation of Java. The result is that the dynamic checks on interface methods may be safely
removed for free. Additionally, the pruned stack maps are sparser, and therefore they may
be smaller. We describe the case of (idealized) Java bytecode, but the solution is not tied to
this particular case, and would apply to other object oriented languages, even with general
multiple inheritance.
In this report, the term analysis refers to the typing process that produces stack maps,
checking is the validation of those stack maps on the consumer’s side, and verification
encompasses analysing, possibly pruning, and checking.
1.1 Motivating example
Figure 1 provides a small example which illustrates the existing verification and its extension
to conjunctive types. Figure 1a represents a bytecode program written in pseudo Java,
without type information. We suppose a type hierarchy with three classes A, B and C and
four interfaces Ii (i ∈ [1, . . . , 4]) where C implements and I3 extends I1 and I2, and A
and B implements I3 and I4. Each interface Ii declares a method mi. Figure 1b shows
the completion of the type hierarchy that is used by our enhanced analyser, which adds the
elements I1 ∧ I2 and I3 ∧ I4 to the type hierarchy.
The standard bytecode verifier ignores interfaces. Thus, in method foo, the variable i
at program point 3 is given as type the first common super-class of A and B, i.e., Object.
Note also that the call to each method mi is in fact a call to the method of interface Ii, where
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void foo(boolean b) {
if (b) {
(1) i:=new A();
} else {
(2) i:=new B();
(3) }
(4) i.m1();
(5) i.m2();
}
(a) Main method
Object
I2
I1 ∧ I2
I1
C I3
I3 ∧ I4
I4
A B
(b) Type hierarchy
Figure 1: A Java bytecode program and its type hierarchy
it is declared. When analysing those calls, the bytecode verifier only checks statically that
the variable i contains an object type. At run-time, the JVM dynamically checks whether
the object referenced by i implements I1 and I2, before doing a lookup with respect to
the dynamic type of i. If it is not the case, a run-time exception is thrown.
Our extended analizer will type the example program using conjunctions of types, and
in particular, the variable i at program point 3 will have type I3 ∧ I4, which is propagated
at program points 4 and 5. As this is a sub-type of both I1 and I2, this ensures that the
two method calls are safe. However, for the purpose of lightweight bytecode verification, it
is desirable to avoid annotating the variables with conjunctions. The backtracking pruning
algorithm proposed in Section 5 detects that in the above conjunction, only I3 is needed to
type the subsequent method invocations, hence it removes I4. In the resulting stack map,
the variable i has therefore the type I3 at program points 3, 4 and 5.
The example also shows that opting for a backward program analysis does not simplify
the problem. An analyser which starts from the invocation sites and propagates these “uses”
of a variable to the point of definition would still require the use of conjunctions and lead
to a back-tracking algorithm. With such a technique, the variable i at program point 5
would get the type I2. The problem arises when typing i at program point 4: it must be
the intersection of I1 and I2, which requires either to introduce the conjunction I1 ∧ I2,
or to choose one of the types C and I3. The right choice can only be made knowing the
creation sites 1 and 2, hence the need for a backtraking algorithm.
1.2 Organisation of the report
We define the intraprocedural part of a small-step operational semantics with big-step calls
for a subset of the Java bytecode (Section 2), with a low-level treatment of values that allows
for a convincing definition of the memory safety property (which is the base for all other
security properties). The analysis is presented in Section 3 in terms of an abstract inter-
pretation [CC77], and proved correct. We define the notions of stack map and lightweight
verification for a method, and state the main soundness lemma for a method. The inter-
procedural layer of the semantics is discussed in Section 4, where the soundness theorem
for a complete program is proved. Section 5 describes the pruning algorithms. We give
an efficient semi-algorithm that works in all but some well-identified, pathological cases,
that do not seem to occur in average Java programs. We report on some experiments on
Irisa
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verifying Eclipse and a suite of Java MIDP midlets for mobile phones with a more complete
prototype implementation in Section 6. Related work is discussed in Section 7 and Section 8
concludes.
1.3 Notations
Sets have long italic names, other constants and constants functions are in roman, with the
exception of bytecode instructions for which we use sans serif. Meta-variables have short
lowercase italic names, except that we write C, I, F ♯ for classes, interfaces and abstract
transfer functions, respectively.
For sets a and b, we write a ⇀ b for the set of partial functions from a to b. We use
the notation {x1 7→ v1, . . . , xn 7→ vn} to represent partial functions in extension. If f is
a partial function, dom(f) is the domain of f , and any boolean expression e containing a
sub-expression f(e′) implicitely means: e′ ∈ dom(f) ∧ e. Anonymous functions are denoted
by lambda-abstractions or using a dot notation: for example, the expression e[·, . . . , ·] stands
for λx1, . . . , xn.e[x1, . . . , xn]. We note |x| for the cardinal of the set x, or the cardinal of its
domain if x is a function. If f is a function (or a partial function), we note f [x ← v] the
function that maps x to v and any y 6= x to f(y).
Cartesian product takes precedence over other set operations: × ≺ ∪,→,⇀.
2 Intraprocedural semantics and memory safety
In this section we define formally our bytecode language and its semantics, and state the
memory safety property that we ensure. We first define the semantics (and safety) of one
single method, parameterised by the semantics of the (direct) method calls it may involve.
We add the interprocedural part of the semantics (and the corresponding proof) in Section 4.
2.1 The Java bytecode language
We present a minimal subset of the language, abstracting away irrelevant features (such
as the operand stack) while keeping the main aspects (objects, interface methods) that are
relevant to typing. The subset is sufficiently representative for the results to extend to the
whole Java bytecode.
2.1.1 Simplifications
The following features are absent from our language.
Operand stack The local operand stack is an aspect of the language (and of the verifi-
cation process) independent of the abstract domain used for the verification so we omit it,
replacing actual bytecode instructions by a three-addresses style instruction set that operates
directly on local variables.
Other aspects Constant fields and static or interface members, exceptions, void methods,
basic types other than int, sub-routines, threads, class and objects initialisation, access
control (visibility), as well as as explicit type checks (the important checkcast instruction)
are not considered. We discuss their impact on this study in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Also,
for conciseness we use less specialised instructions than the real virtual machine (for example,
we merge iaload and aaload, ireturn and areturn).
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2.1.2 Object oriented structure
The notations defined in this and following sections are summarized in Figure 12 in Ap-
pendix A. Let ident be the set of fully qualified Java identifiers.
Classes and interfaces We assume a set class ⊂ ident of class names with a distinguished
element Object, and a disjoint set interface ⊂ ident of interface names. We define the set
type of types recursively as:
type ::= int | C | I | t []
where C ∈ class , I ∈ interface , and t ∈ type.
Type hierarchy The class hierarchy is modeled by the following three functions:
super : class \ {Object} → class
implements : class → P(interface)
extends : interface → P(interface)
The function super must be the ancestor function of a tree with root Object:
∀C ∈ class ∃i ≥ 0 superi(C) = Object.
Methods A method signature is made of an object type, an identifier and a list of param-
eter types. We assume a subset msig of such signatures which represents the methods that
are declared in the program being verified:
msig ⊂ {t .m(t1, . . . , tn) | t ∈ type \ {int},m ∈ ident , ti ∈ type}
Note that we have a virtual method signature if t is a class or an array type, and an interface
method signature otherwise. In the following, we do not distinguish between the two, as we
do not need to precisely model the lookup procedure. We let
arity(t .m(t1, . . . , tn)) = n.
Each method signature has a return type given by the function
result : msig → type.
Fields A field signature is made of a class name, an identifier and a type. We assume a
subset fsig of such signatures:
fsig ⊂ {C.f : t | C ∈ class , f ∈ ident , t ∈ type}
Note that C.f : t represents a field declared in class C, and consequently, the set of fields
that are relevant for a given class of objects must be looked for in its super-classes too (see
the function fields in Section 2.2.2).
2.1.3 The current method
As stated in the introduction, we first consider one execution of one “current” method, hence
method-related definitions are not indexed by a signature.
Irisa
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Attributes of the current method We write var for the set of local variables of the
method to verify and arg ⊆ var for its set of formal parameters, whose types are described
by the function
targ : arg → type.
The return type of the current method is denoted by
tret ∈ type.
Program points are represented by the interval
ppoint = [0, |ppoint | − 1].
Instructions The instruction set is parameterised by class , type, msig , fsig , var and
ppoint . We define the set expr of expressions and the set instr of instructions as follows.
Here C ranges over classes, t over types, ms over method signatures, fs over field signatures,
x, y, z, xi over local variables, and p over program points.
expr ::= n n ∈ [−231, 231 − 1]
| null | y + z | new C | y.fs | new t [y] | y[z]
| y.ms(x1, . . . , xarity(ms))
instr ::= x := e e ∈ expr
| x.fs := y | x[y] := z | goto p | if x < y p | return x
The method code is represented by the function
code : ppoint → instr
mapping program points to instructions. The last instruction code(|ppoint | − 1) must be
either goto p for some p or return x for some x.
These last definitions enforce some well-formedness constraints on the code: the execution
remains within the bounds of the code and cannot fall through the end, only valid local
variables are referred to, and methods are always called with the right number of arguments.
These properties are normally checked by the bytecode verifier prior to the type verifications.
2.2 Semantics
The operational semantics is defined as a small-step transition relation between program
states (except for method calls which are big-step).
2.2.1 Discussion
First we discuss some design choices about the level and the kind of abstractions that are
used.
Abstracting values and memory We choose to use a single data type of 32-bit values
both for signed integer values and memory locations (note that objects and arrays are still
annotated with their dynamic type, as in actual JVM implementations). This differs notably
frommost other formalisations where a disjoint set of locations is used (or equivalently, values
are tagged with their type), this choice being only informally justified, as for example in
[Pus99]:
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“[. . . ] the type information is not used to determine the operational semantics
of (correct) JVM code.”
Barthe, Dufay, Jakubiec and de Sousa [BDJdS02] formalized this intuition by considering the
actual virtual machine (which is called offensive) as an abstraction of the tagged (defensive)
machine, and proving that the former correctly abstracts the latter, whenever the latter
does not raise a type error (which is true for verifiable bytecode). Working directly with an
untagged semantics immediately frees from of the risk of making unwanted implicit typing
assumptions.
A precise model of the representation of objects and arrays in the memory is not necessary
however. It is enough to use functions, state explicitly their domain and not use them out of
it: any concrete representation, for example that maps these domains to sets of offsets, will
conform to this model, provided the memory allocator keeps track of the range of objects
and does not make them overlap.
Errors We make an important distinction between two kinds of errors:
• Runtime errors that are checked for dynamically and cause the virtual machine to
raise an exception, such as accessing an array out of bounds or putting an element of
the wrong type in it, are represented by the absence of transition.
• Actual type errors (called linking errors in the JVM specification) that violate the
assumptions that a virtual machine implementation is allowed to make about the code
(see [LY99]), such as dereferencing an integer, or accessing a non-existing field of an
object, are represented by a transition to the special state error. This second kind of
errors must be correctly handled by the bytecode verification, as the behavior of the
virtual machine is unspecified for those cases, and in practice this can result in a crash
(in the optimistic case) or the bypassing of access controls.
In the current JVM, the invokeinterface instruction should raise the exception
IncompatibleClassChangeError if the receiver of the method does not implement the
interface. Because our enhanced bytecode verifier will also type-check interfaces, we shift
this exception from the class of runtime errors to the class of type errors. In our semantics,
interface calls are dealt with like virtual calls and it is a type error if the receiver of an
interface call does not implement the desired interface. Remark that the runtime errors
raised in the explicit cast instruction (which we don’t consider) are not removed by this
technique.
2.2.2 Objects, arrays and states
The notations defined in this and following sections are summarized in Figure 13 in Ap-
pendix A. We write word for the set of 32-bit values. Values are used to represent signed
integers as well as memory locations.
Objects We let fields : class → P(fsig) be the function that returns the set of (transitively
inherited) fields of a class:
fields(C) = {C.f : t ∈ fsig} ∪
{
fields(super(C)) if C 6= Object
∅ otherwise
An object is a pair 〈C, o〉 where C ∈ class and o : fields(C) → word gives the value of the
relevant fields. We write object for the set of objects.
object = {〈C, o〉 | C ∈ class , o : fields(C)→ word}
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Arrays We let array be the set of arrays, annotated with their element type (which can
be an array type):
array = {〈t , a〉 | t ∈ type, a : [0, n− 1]→ word , n ≥ 0}
Program states We define heap as the sets of partial mappings from non-zero values to
objects and arrays:
heap = word \ {0}⇀ (object ∪ array).
The memory allocator is represented by a partial function
alloc : heap ⇀ word \ {0}
that maps a heap h to a value that is not defined in h (the absence of value represent the
failure of the allocation)1:
∀h ∈ heap alloc(h) = v =⇒ v 6∈ dom(h).
A program state s = 〈h, l , p〉 consists of a heap, a (total) mapping from variables to
values, and a program point:
state = heap × (var → word)× ppoint
2.2.3 Dynamic typing
We first recall the standard sub-typing order  ⊆ type × type induced by the functions
super, implements and extends. Note that, in J2SE, every array type is a sub-type of the
two interfaces Cloneable and Serializable (which therefore we assume exist).
t  t
t  t ′ t ′  t ′′
t  t ′′
t  t ′
t []  t ′[]
C  super(C)
I ∈ implements(C)
C  I
I ′ ∈ extends(I)
I  I ′
I  Object t []  Cloneable t []  Serializable
The precise definition of this order is not important, the results generalize to slightly different
settings and do not strongly rely on the last three rules in particular. The key properties
that are actually used in the following are:
• that  is a partial order
• the existence of the maximum element (which is called Object in this case)
• the covariant ordering of array types (third rule in the first line)
and of course the link with the functions super, implements and extends, for the language
that we consider.
The dynamic typing relation h ⊢ v : t between heaps, 32-bit values and types is defined
as follows:
h ⊢ v : int h ⊢ 0 : t
h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object C  t
h ⊢ v : t
h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array t []  t ′
h ⊢ v : t ′
1This is not completely accurate, as the allocation obviously depends on the needed size.
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It must be noted that this relation can be implemented efficiently by traversing the type
hierarchy above the value whose type is being checked upward. This is crucial since it is
used by the concrete semantics of array assignement.
2.2.4 Method calls
Let bigstep be the type of big-step semantics for methods.
bigstep = P

⋃
n≥0
((heap × word × wordn)× (heap × word ∪ {error}))


Let bs ∈ bigstep and 〈〈h, this , args〉, r〉 ∈ bs . this represents the object on which the method
is to be invoked, and args represents the list of the arguments. The result r is either the
error constant or a pair 〈h′, v〉 ∈ heap×word where v is the returned value and h′ is the heap
obtained by running the method from the initial heap h. For now, the direct method calls
that may arise during the execution of the current method are represented by associating a
big step transition relation
ms
−→ ∈ bigstep
to each method signature ms (note that the relation for one method signature may corre-
spond to several actual methods due to dynamic binding). As the relation is supposed to
represent every possible call without any assumption on the arguments, is must be defined
even for ill-typed ones, possibly with the result error. Also, we make no hypothesis on
the correctness of the invoked method yet, thus the error state may be returned even for
arguments of the right type. The absence of transition from a particular list of arguments
represents non-termination or a runtime exception.
2.2.5 Transition relation
The semantics is given by the transition relation
→ ⊆ state × (state ∪ heap × word ∪ {error})
defined in Figure 2. Some intermediate definitions make use of the additional constant ⊥ to
denote stuck computations.
Comments on some rules A couple of features in this semantics merit explanation.
• Writing to a field (see Figure 2b) always succeeds (provided the field exists for the
target object), even if the value that is written is not of the right type. This is not a
safety violation by itself, only a future misuse of this bad value (for example, accessing
a field it doesn’t have) would be an error.
• Writing to an array always triggers a dynamic check2 and the execution is naturally
stuck in case that the value stored in the array is not a sub-type of the array’s own type,
or if the index is out of bounds (an exception is raised in the real virtual machine).
• In Figure 2c, it is important to remember that a method call can occur with ill-typed
arguments, and that the invoked method itself can be ill-typed, hence the rule for the
error state.
2This is unavoidable with the covariant arrays of the Java type system.
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JnKh,l = n (32-bit signed encoding)
JnullKh,l = 0
Jy + zKh,l = l(y) + l(z)
Jy.fsKh,l =
8>><
>>:
o(fs) if h(l(y)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs ∈ fields(C)
⊥ if l(y) = 0
error if l(y) 6= 0 ∧ l(y) 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(l(y)) 6∈ object
∨ h(l(y)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs 6∈ fields(C)
Jy[z]Kh,l =
8<
:
a(l(z)) if h(l(y)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ 0 ≤ l(z) < |a|
⊥ if l(y) = 0 ∨ h(l(y)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ ¬ 0 ≤ l(z) < |a|
error if l(y) 6= 0 ∧ l(y) 6∈ dom(h) ∨ h(l(y)) 6∈ array
(a) Semantics JeKh,l ∈ word ∪ {error,⊥} of a side-effect free expression e in context h, l
Jx := eK(h, l) =
8><
>:
h, l [x← JeKh,l ]
if JeKh,l 6∈ {⊥, error}
⊥ if JeKh,l = ⊥
error if JeKh,l = error
9>=
>;
if e 6∈ {y.ms(· · · ),
new C,
new t [y]}
Jx := new CK(h, l) =
8<
:
h[v ← 〈C, λfs ∈ fields(C).0〉], l [x← v]
if alloc(h) = v
⊥ if h 6∈ dom(alloc)
Jx := new t [y]K(h, l) =
8<
:
h[v ← 〈t , λi ∈ [0, l(y)].0〉], l [x← v]
if l(y) ≥ 0 ∧ alloc(h) = v
⊥ if l(y) < 0 ∨ h 6∈ dom(alloc)
Jx.fs := yK(h, l) =
8>>><
>>>:
h[l(x)← 〈C, o[fs ← l(y)]〉], l
if h(l(x)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs ∈ fields(C)
⊥ if l(x) = 0
error if l(x) 6= 0 ∧ l(x) 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(l(x)) 6∈ object
∨ h(l(x)) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ fs 6∈ fields(C)
Jx[y] := zK(h, l) =
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
h[l(x)← 〈t , a[l(y) ← l(z)]〉], l
if h(l(x)) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ h ⊢ l(z) : t ∧ 0 ≤ l(y) < |a|
⊥ if l(x) = 0
∨ l(x) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ ¬ (h ⊢ l(z) : t ∧ 0 ≤ l(y) < |a|)
error if l(x) 6= 0 ∧ l(x) 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(l(x)) 6∈ array
(b) Semantics JiK : heap × (var → word ) → (heap × (var → word) ∪ {error,⊥}) of a non-branching
intraprocedural instruction i
i 6∈ {goto p, if · · · , return x, x := y.ms(· · · )} JiK(h, l) 6= ⊥
h, l
i
−→ JiK(h, l) h, l
return x
−→ h, l(x)
h, l(y), l(x1), . . . , l(xn)
ms
−→ h′, v
h, l
x:=y.ms(x1,...,xn)
−→ h′, l [x← v]
h, l(y), l(x1), . . . , l(xn)
ms
−→ error
h, l
x:=y.ms(x1,...,xn)
−→ error
(c) Semantics
i
−→ ⊆ (heap × (var → word)) × (heap × (var → word) ∪ heap × word ∪ {error}) of a
non-branching instruction i
Figure 2: Semantics of Java bytecode
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code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · } h, l
code(p)
−→ h′, l ′
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h′, l ′, p+ 1〉
code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · } h, l
code(p)
−→ h′, v
〈h, l , p〉 → h′, v
code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · } h, l
code(p)
−→ error
〈h, l , p〉 → error
code(p) = goto p′
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p′〉
code(p) = if x < y p′ l(x) < l(y)
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p′〉
code(p) = if x < y p′ l(x) ≥ l(y)
〈h, l , p〉 → 〈h, l , p + 1〉
(d) Small step transition relation → ⊆ state × (state ∪ heap × word ∪ {error})
Figure 2: Semantics of Java bytecode (continued)
2.3 Memory safety
We give a modular definition of memory safety that is stronger than what is actually needed
for a complete program: it includes the preservation of the well-typedness of the heap, and
the fact that the heap is only extended. This property requires some prior definitions to
express accurate invariants about the heap. See Theorem 1 in Section 4 for a minimal
statement.
Well typed heaps The following relation expresses that a heap is consistent.
∀v ∈ word \ {0}


v 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object
∧ ∀C′.f : t ∈ fields(C) h ⊢ o(C′.f : t) : t
∨ h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array
∧ ∀i ∈ [0, |a| − 1] h ⊢ a(i) : t
h ⊢ h
Ordering on heaps The relation ⋐ expresses the preservation of existing objects between
two heaps.
∀v ∈ word \ {0}


v 6∈ dom(h)
∨ h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ h′(v) = 〈C, o′〉 ∈ object
∨ h(v) = 〈t , a〉 ∈ array ∧ h′(v) = 〈t , a′〉 ∈ array
h ⋐ h′
Modular memory-safety The following definition introduces the general safety property
for the transition relation associated with a method. We need to give two variants of it since
we use slightly different formalisations for the transition relation of the current method
and the relations representing method calls. As errors are immediately propagated in the
semantics, it is sound to define the safety as the unreachability of error in the outermost
invocation.
Definition 1 The relation → ⊆ state× (state ∪ (heap×word)∪{error}) is safe with respect
to targ and tret if for all h, l such that h ⊢ h ∧ ∀x ∈ arg h ⊢ l(x) : targ(x) then
〈h, l , 0〉 6→∗ error and 〈h, l , 0〉 →∗ h′, v =⇒ h ⋐ h′ ∧ h′ ⊢ h′ ∧ h′ ⊢ v : tret.
Similarly, a transition relation
ms
−→ ∈ bigstep is safe with respect to the signature ms =
t .m(t1, . . . , tn) if for all h, v, v1, . . . , vn such that h ⊢ h ∧ h ⊢ v : t ∧ ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ vi : ti
then h, v, v1, . . . , vn 6
ms
−→ error and h, v, v1, . . . , vn
ms
−→ h′, v′ =⇒ h ⋐ h′ ∧ h′ ⊢ h′ ∧ h′ ⊢
v′ : result(ms).
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Memory safety and security In this study we choose to focus on memory safety which
is just one aspect of the security of Java bytecode. It basically unsures that the virtual ma-
chine will not crash when executing the program. However, the safe execution of untrusted
bytecode typically requires stronger properties, like the informal idea that a program should
not be able to forge a pointer to a heap location that it is not supposed to have access
to. It is not easy to define formally this requirement without instrumenting the semantics.
For example with the semantics that we just defined we could prove that the heap location
returned by any method whose return type is an reference type be either unnallocated in the
initial heap or reachable from the (reference) arguments on which the method was invoked.
This is ensured by the analysis of Section 3 without any modification: only the proofs have
to be extended by strengthening the concretisation function for the abstract domain. But
this definition is still naive, as it does not distinguish between private or public fields, nor
does it account for the fact that an untrusted program can be given controlled access to
some (private) objects through the invocation of trusted methods from the API. Neverthe-
less, even thoug the memory-safety itself does not imply any access restriction property, the
analysis by which we ensure memory safety represents a large part of what is needed to
ensure security, as shown by Leroy and Rouaix [LR98] who formalizes such stronger security
properties, and give relatively local sufficient conditions, in addition to well-typedness, for
an applet to be safe with respect to these properties.
3 Extended bytecode typing
In this section we present an extended abstract domain for interface-aware bytecode ver-
ification and prove it sound with respect to the semantics. The main difference with the
standard bytecode verification is the use of interfaces in types, which make the runtime check
in the “invokeinterface” instruction unnecessary. Another difference is that integers are not
distinguished from the ⊤v value. This simplifies the presentation and also the stack maps.
The verification is a modular process where each individual method is checked with respect
to its given signature, assuming that the calls that it triggers (possibly of the same method)
are correctly described by these signatures. The interprocedural aspects will be treated in
Section 4. The definitions of this section are summarized in Figure 14 in Appendix A.
3.1 Abstract domain
The abstract domain elements are called stack maps in the context of Java bytecode ver-
ification, as they normally map program points to abstract operand stacks. We keep this
name even though the stack is absent in our setting.
3.1.1 Stack maps
Our abstract domain associates a type to each variable at each program point. This type is
either ⊤v (for non-reference values), null, or a conjunction of object (or array) types.
value♯ ::= null | ⊤v
| t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn n ≥ 1, ti ∈ type \ {int},
∀i, j ≤ n ti  tj =⇒ i = j
state♯ = var → value♯
map = ppoint → state♯
state♯
⊤s
⊥s = state
♯ ∪ {⊥s,⊤s}
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⊤v
Object
JI Cloneable Serializable
I ∧ J
C
Cloneable ∧ Serializable
Object[] int[]
J[]I[] Cloneable[] . . .
. . .I[] ∧ J[]
C[]
null
Figure 3: Abstract domain for a hierarchy containing the interfaces I, J and the class C.
The conjunctions whose concretisation is empty have been omitted for conciseness.
The two special abstract states ⊥s and ⊤s indicate respectively an unreachable program
point and the possibility of the (concrete) error state being reachable. We also define the
abbreviation state♯
⊤s
⊥s . Conjunctions are defined up to the order, i.e., t ∧ t
′ = t ′ ∧ t .
A conjunction is to be interpreted as the set of objects that are a member of every
atomic type in it. Note that we only consider conjunctions of unordered atomic types.
This is necessary to be able to define an order on abstract values and not just a pre-order,
and also to make the concretisation (almost) injective (as adding a super-type of another
conjunct does not change the concretisation of a conjunction). Another isomorphic solution
is to consider upward-closed (with respect to ) sets of atomic types. We choose the first
representation which is more compact and hence allows us to compute least upper bounds
efficiently (see Section 3.1.4). An example abstract domain value♯ is presented in Figure 3.1.
The following definition identifies a subset of stack maps in which we want to choose a
“certificate” to send with the current method.
Definition 2 A stack map m ∈ map is conjunction-free if all of its conjunctions t1∧· · ·∧ tn
are reduced to one element ( i.e., n = 1).
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3.1.2 Concretisation
We define the concretisation functions γh : value
♯ → P(word), h ∈ heap, γp : state
♯⊤s
⊥s →
P(state ∪ {error}), p ∈ ppoint and γ : (value♯ ∪ {⊤s})→ P((heap × word) ∪ {error}) by
γh(⊤v) = word
γh(null) = {0}
γh(t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn) = {v ∈ word | ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ v : ti}
γp(⊥s) = ∅
γp(⊤s) = state ∪ {error}
γp(l
♯) = {〈h, l , p〉 ∈ state | h ⊢ h ∧ ∀x ∈ var l(x) ∈ γh(l ♯(x))}
γ(⊤s) = heap × word ∪ {error}
γ(v♯) =
{
h, v | h ⊢ h ∧ v ∈ γh(v♯)
}
.
3.1.3 Partial order
The partial orders ⊑v ⊆ value
♯ × value♯ and ⊑ ⊆ state♯
⊤s
⊥s × state
♯⊤s
⊥s are defined by the
following rules:
null ⊑v v♯ v♯ ⊑v ⊤v
∀j ≤ n′ ∃i ≤ n ti  t ′j
t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn ⊑v t ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ t
′
n′
⊥s ⊑ s♯ s♯ ⊑ ⊤s
∀x ∈ var l ♯(x) ⊑ l ′♯(x)
l ♯ ⊑ l ′♯
The fact that those relations are partial orders follows from  being a partial order and
from the restriction to conjunctions of unordered atomic types.
3.1.4 Least upper bound
The (commutative) least upper bound operators ⊔v : value
♯ × value♯ → value♯ and ⊔ :
state♯
⊤s
⊥s × state
♯⊤s
⊥s → state
♯⊤s
⊥s are defined by
null ⊔v v♯ = v♯
v♯ ⊔v ⊤v = ⊤v
t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn
⊔v t ′1 ∧ · · · ∧ t
′
n′
=


let T =
{t ∈ type | ∃i ≤ n, j ≤ n′ ti  t ∧ t ′j  t}
in∧
{t ∈ T | ∀t ′ ∈ T t ′  t =⇒ t ′ = t}
⊥s ⊔ s♯ = s♯
s♯ ⊔ ⊤s = ⊤s
l ♯ ⊔ l ′♯ = λx.l ♯(x) ⊔v l
′♯(x).
The least upper bound of two (non-empty) conjunctions is always defined (and non-empty),
because Object is a super type of all reference types (including interfaces and array types).
The second line in the least upper bounds of two conjunctions ensures that we keep only
maximal atoms.
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The actual computation of the least upper bound of two conjunctions can be performed
efficiently: as only minimal types t ∈ T will be kept, it is sufficient to find the first super-
class and/or super-interfaces of each pair ti, t
′
j , which is done by traversing the hierarchy
above ti and t
′
j (array types pose no problem either).
3.1.5 Transfer function
Figure 4 defines the abstract semantics as two relations
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s)× ppoint
and
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → value♯).
3.2 Correctness of the abstraction
We now prove the consistency of the previous definitions.
3.2.1 Partial order
The following lemma ensures the consistency of the partial order with respect to the con-
cretisation, which is crucial for the correctness of the verification.
Lemma 1 For all h ∈ heap and v♯, v′♯ ∈ value♯, if v♯ ⊑v v
′♯ then γh (v
♯) ⊆ γh(v
′♯).
For all p ∈ ppoint and s♯, s′♯ ∈ state♯
⊤s
⊥s , if s
♯ ⊑ s′♯ then γp(s♯) ⊆ γp(s′
♯
). For all
v♯, v′
♯ ∈ value♯ ∪ {⊤s}, if v′
♯
= ⊤s ∨ v♯ ⊑v v′
♯
then γ(v♯) ⊆ γ(v′♯).
The proof follows from the definitions.
3.2.2 Least upper bound
The least upper bound operator is used during the fix-point computation and must be correct
for the generated stack map to be accepted by the checker.
Lemma 2 For all v♯, v′♯ ∈ value♯, v♯ ⊔v v′
♯ ⊒v v♯ and v♯ ⊔v v′
♯ ⊒v v′
♯. For all
s♯, s′
♯ ∈ state♯
⊤s
⊥s , s
♯ ⊔ s′♯ ⊒ s♯ and s♯ ⊔ s′♯ ⊒ s′♯.
The proof follows from the definitions.
3.2.3 Transfer function
The core of the correctness of the analysis resides in the following lemma which says that
the concrete transition relation is correctly approximated by the abstract one.
Lemma 3 Suppose that for every signature ms the relation
ms
−→ is safe with respect to ms
(see Definition 1). Let s ∈ state, r ∈ state ∪ (heap × word) ∪ {error}, p ∈ ppoint and
l ♯ ∈ state♯ such that s→ r and s ∈ γp(l ♯). Then one of the following holds:
1. p
F ♯
−→ p′ and r ∈ γp′(F ♯(l ♯)) for some p′ and F ♯, or
2. p
F ♯
−→ and r ∈ γ(F ♯(l ♯)) for some F ♯.
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JnK♯
l♯
= ⊤v
JnullK♯
l♯
= null
Jy + zK♯
l♯
= ⊤v
Jnew CK♯
l♯
= C
Jnew t [y]K♯
l♯
= t []
Jy.fsK♯
l♯
=

t if fs = C.f : t ∧ l ♯(y) ⊑v C
⊤s otherwise
Jy[z]K♯
l♯
=
8<
:
t if l ♯(y) = t [] t ∈ type
⊥s if l
♯(y) = null
⊤s if l
♯(y) 6∈ {null} ∪ {t [] | t ∈ type}
Jy.ms(x1, . . . , xn)K
♯
l♯
=
8>><
>:
result(ms)
if ms = t .m(t1, . . . , tn)
∧ l ♯(y) ⊑v t ∧ ∀i ≤ n l
♯(xi) ⊑v ti
⊤s otherwise
(a) Abstract semantics JeK♯
l♯
∈ value♯ ∪ {⊥s,⊤s} of an expression e in the abstract context l♯
Jx := eK♯(l ♯) =
8>><
>>:
l ♯[x ← JeK♯
l♯
]
if JeK♯
l♯
6∈ {⊥s,⊤s}
⊥s if JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊥s
⊤s if JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊤s
Jx.fs := yK♯(l ♯) =
8<
:
l ♯ if fs = C.f : t
∧ l ♯(x) ⊑v C ∧ l
♯(y) ⊑v t
⊤s otherwise
Jx[y] := zK♯(l ♯) =
8<
:
l ♯ if l ♯(x) = t [] t ∈ type
⊥s if l
♯(x) = null
⊤s if l
♯(y) 6∈ {null} ∪ {t [] | t ∈ type}
(b) Abstract semantics JiK♯ : state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
of a non-branching instruction i (i 6= return x)
code(p) 6∈ {return x, goto p′, if · · · }
p
Jcode(p)K♯
−→ p + 1
code(p) = goto p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p′
code(p) = if x < y p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p′
code(p) = if x < y p′
p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p + 1
code(p) = return x
p
λl♯.l♯(x)
−→
(c) Abstract transition relations −→ ⊆ ppoint×(state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
)×ppoint and −→ ⊆ ppoint×(state♯ →
value♯)
Figure 4: Abstract semantics of Java bytecode
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Furthermore, the functions F ♯ that label the abstract transition relations are monotone.
Proof: By definition we have that s = 〈h, l , p〉. We reason by case on the instruction
code(p).
• Case goto p′: then r = 〈h, l , p′〉 and p
λl♯.l♯
−→ p′. From 〈h, l , p〉 ∈ γp(l ♯) we derive
〈h, l , p′〉 ∈ γp′(l
♯) and we are in case 1.
• Case if x < y p′ is similar.
• Case return x: then r = h, l(x) and p
λl♯.l♯(x)
−→ which falls in case 2 because l(x) ∈
γ(l ♯(x)).
• Case code(p) 6∈ {goto p′, if · · · , return x}: then p
Jcode(p)K♯
−→ p + 1 and thus we have to
prove that r ∈ γp+1(Jcode(p)K♯(〈h, l , p〉)).
– Case x := y.ms(x1, . . . , xn): then we have ms = t .m(t1, . . . , tn). If l
♯(y) ⊑v t and
∀i ≤ n l ♯(xi) ⊑v ti then h ⊢ l(y) : t and ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ l(xi) : ti (by definition
of γh). This implies (by safety hypothesis on
ms
−→) that r = 〈h′, l [x ← v], p+ 1〉
with h ⋐ h′, h′ ⊢ h′ and h′ ⊢ v : result(ms). From l ∈ γh(l ♯), h ⋐ h′ and
h′ ⊢ v : result(ms) we deduce that l [x ← v] ∈ γh′(l ♯[x ← result(ms)]) and we
conclude since Jx := y.ms(x1, . . . , xn)K
♯(l ♯) = l ♯[x ← result(ms)]. Otherwise,
Jx := y.ms(x1, . . . , xn)K
♯(l ♯) = ⊤s and this is trivial.
– Case code(p) 6∈ {gotop′, if · · · , returnx, x := y.ms(· · · )}: then we know that
Jcode(p)K(h, l) 6= ⊥ and furthermore, we have either r = error ∧ Jcode(p)K(h, l) =
error or r = 〈h′, l ′, p + 1〉 ∧ h′, l ′ = Jcode(p)K(h, l). Therefore we must prove
that either Jcode(p)K(h, l) = error ∧ Jcode(p)K♯(l ♯) = ⊤s or Jcode(p)K(h, l) =
h′, l ′ ∧ 〈h′, l ′, p+ 1〉 ∈ γp+1(Jcode(p)K♯(l ♯)).
∗ Case x := new C: then Jx := new CK(h, l) = h[v ← o], l [x ← v] for some
v and o such that h ⊢ o : C and v 6∈ dom(h). Therefore, we deduce that
h[v ← o] ⊢ h[v ← o], h[v ← o] ⊢ l [x ← v](y) : l ♯(y) for y 6= x and
h[v ← o] ⊢ l [x ← v](x) : C. As Jx := new CK♯(l ♯) = l ♯[x ← C], we can
conclude.
∗ Case x := new t [y] is similar.
∗ Case x := e, e 6∈ {y.ms(· · · ), new C, new t [y]}: then we know that JeKh,l 6= ⊥,
and we have either Jx := eK(h, l) = error ∧ JeKh,l = error or Jx := eK(h, l) =
h, l [x ← JeKh,l ]. Symetrically, either Jx := eK♯(l ♯) = ⊤s ∧ JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊤s or
Jx := eK♯(l ♯) = l ♯[x ← JeK♯
l♯
]. Therefore we must prove that either JeKh,l =
error ∧ JeK♯
l♯
= ⊤s or JeKh,l ∈ γh(JeK
♯
l♯
).
· Case e ∈ {n, y + z}: this is trivial since JeKh,l 6= error and JeK
♯
l♯
= ⊤v
· Case null follows from JeKh,l = 0 and JeK
♯
l♯
= null.
· Case y.fs : from Jcode(p)K(h, l) 6= ⊥ we get l(y) 6= 0. Let fs = C.f : t .
If l ♯(y) ⊑v C then h(l(y)) = 〈C
′, o〉 ∈ O and C′  C (by definition of
γh ), which implies fs ∈ fields(C′) and then Jy.fsKh,l = o(fs). As h ⊢ h, it
follows that h ⊢ o(fs) : t . On the other hand, we know that Jy.fsK♯
l♯
= t
and we conclude. otherwise Jy.fsK♯
l♯
= ⊤s and we are done.
· Case y[z] is similar.
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∗ Case x.fs := y: from Jcode(p)K(h, l) 6= ⊥ we get l(x) 6= 0. Let fs = C.f : t .
If l ♯(x) ⊑v C and l ♯(y) ⊑v t then h(l(x)) = 〈C′, o〉 ∈ O with C′  C and
h ⊢ l(y) : t (by definition of γh), which implies that fs ∈ fields(C′) and then
Jx.fs := yK(h, l) = h[l(x) ← 〈C′, o[fs ← l(y)]〉], l . As h ⊢ h and h ⊢ l(y) : t ,
it follows that h[l(x)← 〈C′, o[fs ← l(y)]〉] ⊢ h[l(x)← 〈C′, o[fs ← l(y)]〉] and
∀z ∈ var l(z) ∈ γh[l(x)←〈C′,o[fs←l(y)]〉](l
♯(z)). On the other hand, we know
that Jx.fs := yK♯(l ♯) = l ♯ and we conclude. otherwise Jx.fs := yK♯(l ♯) = ⊤s
and we are done.
∗ Case x[y] := z is similar.
The monotonicity of the functions F ♯ follows from the definitions. 
3.3 Analysis and checking
The following definition introduce the notion of witness of the current method whose signa-
ture is given by targ and tret.
Definition 3 A witness is a stack map m ∈ map such that
1. ∀x ∈ var m(0)(x) ⊒v
{
targ(x) if x ∈ arg
⊤v otherwise
2. ∀p, p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
−→ p′ =⇒ F ♯(m(p)) ⊑ m(p′)
3. ∀p ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
−→ =⇒ F ♯(m(p)) ⊑v tret
Note that by definition of stack maps, witnesses contain no ⊤s or ⊥s. This correspond
respectively to the assumptions that the code should type without error, and that even dead
code should be typable. This second condition is necessary for the pruning to work.
The following lemma shows that the memory safety property can be ensured by simply
checking that some given stack map is a witness, and shows how to compute the least witness.
The next section will show that, for Java programs, the least witness can be pruned resulting
in a witness without conjunction.
Lemma 4 Suppose that every relation
ms
−→ is safe with respect to ms (see Definition 1). If
there exists a witness m then the relation → is safe with respect to targ and tret. Moreover,
the least witness3 (if there exists a witness) can be computed by fixpoint iteration.
Proof: The first point follows directly from the previous definitions and lemmas: assume
that h ⊢ h and ∀x ∈ arg h ⊢ l(x) : targ(x). We prove by induction that if 〈h, l , 0〉 →∗ r
then either r = 〈h′, l ′, p′〉 ∈ γp′(m(p′)) for some p′ and h ⋐ h′ or r = h′, v ∈ γ(tret) and
h ⋐ h′.
• Let x ∈ var . If x ∈ arg then from h ⊢ l(x) : targ(x) andm(0)(x) ⊒v targ(x) (condition 1
of Definition 3) we get that l(x) ∈ γh(targ(x)) ⊑v γh(m(0)(x)) (Lemma 1). Otherwise,
m(0)(x) ⊒v ⊤v and γh(⊤v) ∋ l(x). In both cases, we have that l(x) ∈ γh(m(0)(x)).
As h ⊢ h, we obtain 〈h, l , 0〉 ∈ γ0(m(0)). And obviously, h ⋐ h.
• Assume that s = 〈h′, l ′, p′〉 ∈ γp′(m(p′)) with h ⋐ h′ and s → r. Then, applying
Lemma 3 we get two cases.
3The abstract state ⊥s is absent from witnesses by definition, but the state λx ∈ var .null is a minimum
of state♯. Thus, if the set of witnesses is not empty, it has a least element.
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– If p′
F ♯
−→ p′′ and r ∈ γp′′ (F ♯(m(p′))) then by condition 2 of Definition 3 we have
F ♯(m(p′)) ⊑ m(p′′) and we conclude that r ∈ γp′′(m(p′′)). As stack maps contain
no ⊤s, we conclude that r = 〈h′′, l ′′, p′′〉. The fact that h′ ⋐ h′′ follows from the
definitions, as a step of the semantics never deletes, moves or modifies the type
of an existing object. By transitivity, we get h ⋐ h′′.
– If p′
F ♯
−→ and r ∈ γ(F ♯(m(p′))) then by condition 3 of Definition 3 we have
F ♯(m(p′)) ⊑v tret and we deduce that r ∈ γ(tret), and thus r = h′, v (with the
same h′ as in state s). So we have h ⋐ h′ by hypothesis.
This proves that 〈h, l , 0〉 6→∗ error. Also, if 〈h, l , 0〉 →∗ h, v we are in the second case:
h′, v ∈ γ(tret) and h ⋐ h′ (that is, h′ ⊢ h′ ∧ h′ ⊢ v : tret). This proves the first point. The
second is a standard result of the abstract interpretation theory, knowing that the lattice
state♯
⊤s
⊥s satisfies the “finite ascending chain” condition and that the functions F
♯ in the
abstract semantics are monotone. 
4 Interprocedural glue
We now formalise the whole semantics for the set of methods that compose a program and
present the last induction step, showing that the safety of individual method entails, together
with the consistency checks performed at load time (sub-typing of overridden methods, etc.),
the safety of the whole program with respect to a big-step semantics for method calls. The
following definitions and proofs are given only to justify the choice of analysing a method in
an intraprocedural way, representing the (possibly recursive) methods calls by fixed relations,
and are completely independant from the rest of the report.
4.1 Semantics
We first complete the definition of the concrete semantics to account for a set of method
bodies, dynamic method lookup and recursive method calls. The new definitions introduced
in this section are summarized in Figure 15 in Appendix A.
4.1.1 From the current method to a complete program
We assume that the set of parameters of the method considered so far is totally ordered:
arg = {this, p1, . . . , pn} (in real bytecode this would be given implicitely by the signature,
the variables names being natural integers, arguments first). The terminating executions of
the current method are represented by a big-step relation
·
→, (var , arg, ppoint , code)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ ∈ bigstep.
We make explicit its “parameters”, i.e., the function
·
→ : msig → bigstep
associating to each signature ms the relation
ms
→ that we used (Section 2.2.4) to represent
direct calls to ms, and the body
(var , arg, ppoint , code)
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of the method we considered. Relation
·
→, (var , arg, ppoint , code)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ is defined as follows:
l(this) = v ∀i ≤ n l(pi) = vi 〈h, l , 0〉 →∗ r r 6∈ state
h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→, (var , arg , ppoint , code)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ r
Remark that the two versions of Definition 1 are consistent with this definition: the
small-step semantics → of the current method of name m is safe with respect to targ and
tret if and only if its big-step semantics (that we just defined) is safe with respect to the
signature
ms = targ(this).m(targ(p1), . . . , targ(pn)),
assuming that
result(ms) = tret.
Now we generalise this notation, by considering a partial mapping
body : msig ⇀ {(var , arg, ppoint , code) as in Section 2.1.3},
which represents the whole program by giving an implementation to some method signatures
(the function body is partial because interface methods have no implementation). Section 2
can thus be seen as the definition of the higher order function
·, ·︸︷︷︸
−→ : (msig → bigstep)× {body(ms) | ms ∈ msig} → bigstep.
Accordingly, Lemma 4 reads: if
·
→ is such that every
ms
→ is safe with respect to ms and if
there exists a witness m for a given method body body(ms0), then
·
→, body(ms0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ is safe
with respect to ms0.
4.1.2 Dynamic method lookup
The details of the concrete lookup procedure are not needed to establish the correctness of
the bytecode verification. We just represent it by a partial function
lookup : {t , t ′.m(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ (type \ {int})×msig | t  t
′}⇀ class
such that
lookup(t , t ′.m(t1, . . . , tn)) = C =⇒
t  C
∧ C.m(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ msig
∧ result(C.m(t1, . . . , tn))  result(t ′.m(t1, . . . , tn)).
This assumption correspond to the checks that are performed at class loading time, in
addition to the hypothesis on the method lookup procedure itself.
We can now associate to each method signature a big-step semantics that correspond to
the lookup of this signature on a particular object or array (not just to executing the code
of this signature if any). The semantics
·
→,ms︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ ∈ bigstep
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of a method signature ms is defined by the following two rules:
d > 0 ms = t .m(t1, . . . , tn) ¬ h ⊢ v : t
h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→,ms︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ error
v 6= 0
h(v) = 〈C, o〉 ∈ object ∧ t = C
∨ h(v) = 〈t ′, a〉 ∈ array ∧ t = t ′[]
ms = t ′′.m(t1, . . . , tn)
t  t ′′
lookup(t ,ms) = C′
ms ′ = C′.m(t1, . . . , tn)
ms ′ ∈ dom(body)
h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→, body(ms ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ r
h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→,ms︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ r
4.1.3 Recursive method invocation
Finally, the semantics
·
−→ of the program is defined as the least fix-point of the (continuous)
function
S : (msig → bigstep)→ (msig → bigstep)
defined by
S(
·
→)(ms) =
·
→,ms︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ .
In other words, for all ms ∈ msig ,
ms
−→ =
⋃
d≥0
((
Sd(λms ∈ msig .∅)
)
(ms)
)
Intuitively, d is the maximum depth of the method calls in this formula.
4.2 Correctness of the modular verification
Theorem 1 lifts the correctness lemma to the complete program, thus showing the soundness
of the intraprocedural view.
Theorem 1 If there exists a witness for every method body then for every method signature
ms ∈ msig,
ms
−→ is safe with respect to ms. In particular, for a method main of class C,
{1 7→ 〈C, λfs ∈ fields(C).0〉}, 1
C.main()
6→∗ error.
Proof: If h, v, v1, . . . , vn
ms
−→d r then (h, v, v1, . . . , vn), r ∈ Sd(λms .∅) for some d ≥ 0.
Therefore, as ∅ is safe with respect to any signature, it is enough to prove that if for some
·
→ ∈ msig → bigstep,
ms
→ is safe with respect to ms for all ms ∈ msig , then this is also true
for S(
·
→).
So, let
·
→ ∈ msig → bigstep such that for all ms ,
ms
→ is safe with respect to ms. Let ms0 =
t ′′.m(t1, . . . , tn), and h, v, v1, . . . , vn, r such that h ⊢ h, h ⊢ v : t ′′, ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ vi : ti and
h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→,ms0︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ r. Then only the second rule applies, so we have h ⊢ v : t , t  t ′′, and
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h, v, v1, . . . , vn
·
→, body(ms ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ r where ms ′ = C′.m(t1, . . . , tn) where C′ = lookup(t ,ms0). As
ms
→ is safe for everyms, and since there exists a witness for body(ms ′), we can apply Lemma 4
and we get that
·
→, body(ms ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ is safe with respect to ms ′. By hypothesis on lookup, we know
that t ′′  C′, which implies that h ⊢ v : C′. Since h ⊢ h and ∀i ≤ n h ⊢ vi : ti, we can
deduce that r 6= error and r = h, v′ with h ⋐ h′, h′ ⊢ h′ and h′ ⊢ v′ : result(ms ′). Again by
hypothesis on lookup, we have result(ms ′)  result(ms0) and therefore h′ ⊢ v′ : result(ms0).
This proves that,
·
→,ms0︸ ︷︷ ︸
−→ is safe, and we obtain the desired property for S(
·
→). 
5 Lightweight verification by fix-point pruning
In the previous section we formalised a bytecode analysis extended to interfaces, using
conjunctions of types in the abstract domain. The drawback of this extension is its compu-
tational cost, especially in terms of memory, that could make it unapplicable on the smallest
Java capable devices. We will now present an additional step to the lightweight verification
setting that removes the need for computations of sets of types on the consumer side by
computing a witness without conjunction, if the safety of the program does not rely on them.
5.1 Stack map checking without conjunctions
We first present an algorithm that allows this extended verification to work without the
overhead of a checker manipulating conjunctions of interfaces, when it is possible. Then we
argue that this technique works for programs compiled from Java in particular.
5.1.1 Witnesses without conjunction
The key hypothesis of the pruning algorithm that we describe is the existence of a witness
without conjunction. This is not the case of all programs, and Figure 5 shows a method that
has no such witness (the program is shown in pseudo Java but one has to write it directly
in bytecode). But this holds for most programs.
As explained in the previous section, the checking of bytecode mainly consist in the
verification of the conditions of Definition 3, which reduces to computations of the functions
F ♯ of the abstract semantics, and abstract ordering checks ⊑ between abstract states. As the
F ♯s can never “create” a conjunction of types (this is easily verified on the definition), we can
see that the checking of a conjunction-free witness can be performed without manipulating
conjunctions.4
5.1.2 Fix-point pruning
The algorithm of Figure 6 optimistically searches for such a witness, until one is found or
the search space is exhausted. It start from the least witness (if it exists)
lfp ∈ map
4In the real process, the value of the witness is only sent for some program points and the remaining
values are reconstructed at checking time, but no least upper bound is involved, thus the property still holds.
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interface I1 {void m1();}
interface I2 {void m2();}
class A implements I1, I2 {
public void m1() {}
public void m2() {}
}
class B implements I1, I2 {
public void m1() {}
public void m2() {}
}
(a) Class and interface declarations
Object
I1 I2
I1 ∧ I2
A B
(b) Type hierarchy
public void main(String args) {
I1 ∧ I2 i = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
i.m1();
i.m2();
}
(c) Main method
Figure 5: A safe Java bytecode program that has no conjunction-free witness
let w = λp ∈ ppoint .λx ∈ var .⊤v and W = ppoint
while W 6= ∅ do
take p ∈ W (and remove it)
choose a maximal l ♯ ∈ state♯ such that
l ♯ is without conjunction and lfp(p) ⊑ l ♯ ⊑ w(p)
and ∀p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
→ p′ =⇒
F ♯(l ♯) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑ w(p′)
∧ p
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑v tret
if l ♯ 6= w(p) then
w := w[p← l ♯]
W := W ∪ {p′ | p′
F ♯
→ p}
end if
done
return w
Figure 6: Naive (complete) pruning algorithm
computed by direct analysis, and traverses the set of conjunction-free stack maps that are
greater than lfp, until a witness is reached. We know that if there exists a witness without
conjunction, it must belong to this set, by definition of the least fix-point. Fortunately, the
finite ascending chain condition satisfied by the lattice of stack maps ensures that the search
space is finite and therefore the process terminates (which is interesting in case there is no
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such witness). Therefore this algorithm is complete in the sense that if a solution exists, it
will find it.
More precisely, the idea is to start from ⊤v at each program point and each variable
and replace those values by lesser ones until a witness is reached. The non-deterministic
instruction “choose” is to be interpreted as follows: if the choice fails at any point (i.e.,
there is no v♯ satisfying the required conditions) then we backtrack to a previous choice.
The algorithm can terminate either by returning a witness, or by returning nothing, if every
combination of choices eventually gets stuck. As for the strategy used to implement the
work-set (instruction “take”), we found that a stack without duplicates was an efficient and
simple heuristic. Note that this second sort of choice is never undone and does not cause
further backtracking.
Correctness The following theorem formalizes the fact that the algorithm of Figure 6 is
sound and complete (when a witness without conjunction exists).
Theorem 2 The complete pruning algorithm always terminates, either by returning a stack
map w or by a failure in the choice of l ♯. If it terminates by returning some w, then w is a
conjunction-free witness. Furthermore, if a conjunction-free witness w exists, the algorithm
will return such a witness.
Proof: It follows from the definition of l ♯ in the algorithm that w always decreases with
respect to ⊑ during one branch of the execution (the proof is left to the reader). As the
lattice satisfies the finite ascending chain condition, w is eventually stable, at which pointW
strictly decreases (with respect to ⊆), which ensures the termination of every branch. Since
the choice of l ♯ is only finitely branching, the global backtracking algorithm also terminates.
It is clear that the variable w always holds an abstract state without conjunction (because
the value l ♯ that replaces w(p) in the loop has no conjunction). Additionally, the following
invariant is maintained during the execution of the loop:
∀p ∈ ppoint \W ∀p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
→ p′ =⇒ F ♯(w(p)) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(w(p)) ⊑ w(p′)
∧ p
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(w(p)) ⊑v tret
.
The proof is by induction:
• Initially this is obvious since W = ppoint .
• Assume that this is true at some state denoted by wold ,Wold . Let p and l ♯ be the
values considered in the loop, and w,W the next state. Let p′ 6∈ W . Then either
p′ 6∈Wold ∧ p′ 6= p or p′ = p. In both cases it is clear that
∀p′′ ∈ ppoint p′
F ♯
→ p′′ =⇒ F ♯(w(p′)) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(w(p′)) ⊑ wold (p′′)
∧ p′
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(w(p′)) ⊑v tret
.
In the first case, this is because w(p′) = wold (p
′) and because of the invariant at step
wold ,Wold ; in the second case, because w(p
′) = l ♯ and by definition of l ♯. This property
is almost what we want, except that we must replace wold(p
′′) by w(p′′). Thus, to prove
the invariant at the next step, it is enough to show that ∀p′′ ∈ ppoint p′
F ♯
→ p′′ =⇒
wold (p
′′) = w(p′′). We reason by case on p′′: if p′′ = p, then as p′ 6∈ W , the definition
of W implies that l ♯ = wold (p), and since w(p) = l
♯ we get the result. If p′′ 6= p, this
is trivial.
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This proves the soundness.
As for completeness, consider an execution where we always choose an l ♯ such that
l ♯ ⊒ w0(p), where w0 is the witness without conjunction whose existence we assume. We
prove the following invariant: this choice is always possible (and in particular the algorithm
never gets stuck) and the variable w of the algorithm satisfies w ⊒ w0. By induction:
• Initially this is obvious by definition of w.
• Assume that wold ⊒ w0 at some state denoted by wold ,Wold . Let p and l ♯ be the
values considered in the loop, and w,W the next state. Then by definition of w0 and
since wold ⊒ w0 we have that w0(p) is without conjunction and w0(p) ⊒ lfp(p) and
∀p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
→ p′ =⇒ F ♯(w0(p)) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(w0(p)) ⊑ wold (p′)
∧ p
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(w0(p)) ⊑v tret
.
Therefore the set of l ♯ satisfying the condition of the algorithm containsw0(p) and there
exists a maximal such l ♯ that is greater than w0(p). This proves that the execution
does not get stuck at this step, and furthermore, as w = wold [p← l ♯] and l ♯ ⊒ w0(p),
we conclude that w ⊒ w0.
This proves the above invariant. By the first two points of the theorem, we conclude that
the algorithm terminates by returning a witness w without conjunction. 
5.1.3 Java programs
In the Java language, all variables are declared with a fixed element of type (actually, the
basic types are not exactly the same between Java and the Java bytecode: the smaller
integer types are merged with int in the latter). This type must satisfy the same constraints
that are expressed by the abstract semantics in the previous section (including the ones for
interfaces) and can therefore be considered as a witness for each method, where the type
of every variable is the same regardless of the program point. The difference is that the
variables are the source variables, not the bytecode local variables and stack positions.
If the compiler does not transform the structure of the program too much, more precisely
if each variable of the source program is mapped to a (bytecode) local variable in a given
subset of the (bytecode) program points, without overlapping, then we see that the witness
representing the typing of the source code can be renamed to a corresponding witness on
the bytecode. This witness has an interesting feature: it does not contain any conjunction
(because variables are declared with a single type). Therefore, for bytecode compiled from
Java with a “natural” compiler, there exists a conjunction-free witness for every method
(and thus the algorithm of the previous section will find it).
An alternative solution for introducing the verification of interfaces in a lightweight
verification process in the case of Java (source) programs is to generate a stack map from
the type annotations present in the source code, during the compilation process. Indeed,
as the lightweight verification paradigm is being generalized to J2SE Java [JSR06], the task
of generating stack maps is moving from a dedicated “preverifier” program to the compiler
itself. One disadvantage of this technique is that all the tools that are used to manipulate
bytecode (notably the compiler) must take care of stack maps consistently, which can be an
overhead for their design. This is why we follow a different strategy, which extract a witness
without conjunction directly from the bytecode (given that there exists one).
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public void main(String args) {
I1 i1 = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
I2 i2 = args.length > 0 ? new A() : new B();
i1.m1();
i2.m2();
Object i = args.length > 0 ? i1 : i2;
i.toString();
}
Figure 7: A Java program for which a conjunction-free witness cannot be build from the
atomic types of the least fix-point. I1, I2, A and B are defined as in the previous example
(see Figure 5a-b).
5.2 Efficient fix-point pruning
Although the first algorithm is complete, it takes potentially a very long time, since the
search space is the product over program points and local variables of the part of the type
hierarchy that is greater than the corresponding value type in the least fix-point. In fact,
it is rarely necessary, for a given variable and program point, to consider the entire type
hierarchy above the type given by the least fix-point. Most of the time it is enough to choose
one of its conjuncts (if it is a conjunction). The resulting pruning algorithm still has an
exponential complexity, but it performs reasonably fast in practice. We exhibit an artificial
Java program for which this doesn’t work, but we could not find any counter-example in our
(substantial) case studies, which indicates the applicability of the more efficient algorithm
is very general.
5.2.1 Reducing the branching factor
In most cases, the following holds: there exists a witness w ∈ map without conjunction such
that the atomic types that appear in w are atoms of the corresponding conjunctions in the
least fix point.
∀p ∈ ppoint ∀x ∈ var w(p)(x) = t ∈ type =⇒ lfp(p)(x) = t ∧ · · ·
Counter-example This is not true for the program in Figure 7. In this example, we build
two variables i1 and i2 with most precise type I1 ∧ I2. The variable i is then defined as
the “union” of the two, and its type is therefore I1 ∧ I2. However, in a stack map without
conjunction, the type of i1 must be I1, and the type of i2 must be I2 (because we call m1
and m2, respectively). Therefore, the type of i must be greater than the least upper bound
of I1 and I2, i.e., java.lang.Object, which is not an atom of I1 ∧ I2.
5.2.2 Algorithm
Taking into account the hypothesis of section 5.2.1, we proceed by searching for a witness
satisfying this hypothesis. Figure 8 describes the optimized algorithm. The only modifica-
tion with respect to the first version is the set in which l ♯ is chosen.
Correctness The new algorithm is also sound and, though it is incomplete (see the above
counter-example), it will succeeds in finding a witness if the hypothesis of section 5.2.1 holds.
PI n˚1879
30 Besson, Jensen & Turpin
let w = λp ∈ ppoint .λx ∈ var .⊤v and W = ppoint
while W 6= ∅ do
take p ∈W (and remove it)
choose a maximal l ♯ ∈ state♯ such that
∀x ∈ var l ♯(x) = ⊤
∨ l ♯(x) = t ∈ type ∧ lfp(p)(x) = t ∧ · · ·
∨ l ♯(x) = null = lfp(p)(x)
and l ♯ ⊑ w(p)
and ∀p′ ∈ ppoint p
F ♯
→ p′ =⇒
F ♯(l ♯) 6= ⊤s
∧ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑ w(p′)
∧ p
F ♯
→ =⇒ F ♯(l ♯) ⊑v tret
if l ♯ 6= w(p) then
w := w[p← l ♯]
W := W ∪ {p′ | p′
F ♯
→ p}
end if
done
return w
Figure 8: Efficient pruning algorithm. Changes with respect to the previous algorithm are
shown in bold.
If not, the search will fail and the complete algorithm presented before should then be run
instead.
Theorem 3 The optimistic pruning algorithm always terminates, either by returning a
stack map w or by a failure in the choice of l ♯. If it terminates by returning some w,
then w is a witness without conjunction. Furthermore, if a witness w without conjunction
exists whose atoms are in lfp, the algorithm may return w.
The proof is identical to the proof for the complete algorithm.
6 Experiments
We have implemented the ideas presented here in a verifier for real Java bytecode. We
discuss the differences in the concrete implementation and give some experimental results.
6.1 Implementation
A prototype analyser/verifier was developed in Ocaml, using Javalib. It reads Java class
files and adds the stack maps as method attributes, as defined in the Java Virtual Machine
specification.
6.1.1 Extensions
The bytecode language presented so far is considerably simplified. We list the differences
with the real bytecode that we had to address.
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• First, the Java bytecode uses an operand stack in addition to local variables. This
complicates the abstract states, as they now have another list of abstract values, of
variable length. Of course, this adds more reasons for the verification to fail, namely,
(operand) stack overflow or underflow, or the possibility to have different stack heights
at some program point.
• In addition to 32-bit integers, Java bytecode has floats, longs and doubles. floats are
easily abstracted by ⊤v, and the 64-bit types by two ⊤vs. Note that, although 32-bit
integers are not distinguished from shorter integers at the bytecode level (they are in
the source code), this is not the case for arrays of such types. Therefore, to ensure
that the array bounds checks performed at runtime correctly interpret the length field,
the size of elements must be known. This implies that arrays of floats or ints must not
be confused with arrays of shorts. However, individual float and int values can still be
merged, since the instruction for accessing arrays are typed.
• From the verification point of view, exceptions just add some more transitions in
the control flow graph, with a semantics that empties the stack and then push some
constant reference type (the type that is caught by the corresponding handler). They
pose no particular difficulty.
6.1.2 Limitations
While analysing real bytecode, we have omitted some aspects of the verification even in the
concrete implementation:
• Subroutines complicate the verification, and are not generated anymore by compilers.
We did not address this issue and the prototype only applies to code without sub-
routines. The adaptation of abstract interpretation to sub-routines was studied in
[Qia00], and a lightweight verifier capable of handling sub-routines is presented in
[Kle03].
• In addition to memory safety, the original type system used by the bytecode verifier
ensures that any object is initialized before it is “used”. This property is crucial to
security in some cases. For example, to ensure some high-level access property, an API
may rely on the fact that, because of some classes being final, some type of objects can
only be created by a known set of trusted constructors (at the source level) that ensure
a common invariant, but obviously this only holds if some constructor (some initializer
at the bytecode level) is invoked. Similarly, bytecode verification checks that only one
constructor invocation occurs on each object for every super-class of this object, in
the appropriate order.
We did not implement those verifications, because this is a distinct concern (the mem-
ory safety property can be stated without it) whose treatment amount to adding some
more types (for uninitialized objects) to the abstract domain, which poses no particular
difficulty (alternatively, this can also be done as another verification pass).
Also, note that the semantics that we gave to the bytecode used big-step calls, which prevents
us to consider even a simplified (interleaving) version of concurrency, which would require
explicit call stacks. Therefore, in principle, all the results presented here only applies to
single-threaded programs. However, the scheme of the proof (an invariant that holds at
each state of a small-step semantics) does not seem to rely on sequentiality, and we believe
that there is no issue in extending it to threads.
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6.1.3 Stack maps and Checking
The stack maps that are attached to th bytecode are not exactly a representation of
conjunction-free witnesses, but only of the value of such witnesses for a subset of the pro-
gram points. These points correspond basically to the basic blocks of the control flow graph.
This reduces the size of stack maps, while still allowing a very simple checking algorithm
that evaluates program points in order. We will not detail this aspect, as we used the same
subset of program points and the same checking algorithm as Sun’s lightweight bytecode
verifier.
The resulting stack maps are encoded in the class files either as StackMap attributes in
the same format as the lightweight bytecode verifier, or with a new attribute using a sparse
representation. In the latter, we just replaced an array of value types by an array of bits
(to indicate which values are not ⊤v) followed by the list of non-⊤v values. In order for the
comparison to be fair, the sparse representation uses the same verbose encoding of value
types as the stack map representation.
6.2 Results
The following benchmarks were used to experiment with the analysis, pruning and lightweight
checking with interfaces.
6.2.1 Case studies
We have successfully performed the lightweight verification with interfaces of the following
programs.
• 433 old midlets (Java applets for mobile phones) from midlet.org.
• Soot 2.2.4: a framework for analysing Java bytecode
• Eclipse SDK 3.2.2 with all included plug-ins
All methods have been checked, up to the following limitations:
• The (rare) methods that contain sub-routines have not been analysed.
• Some methods that referred to unavailable libraries have not been analysed.
• Dead code in some methods lead to least fix-points with ⊥s for some program points.
The pruning algorithm does not apply in this case.
• In Eclipse, some packages seem to co-exist in different versions that use the same class
names with different hierarchies. As we built conservatively the complete hierarchy of
the distributed classes, some methods in one version could not type-check under the
union of both hierarchies5.
In all cases, a stack map without conjunction could be obtained from the atoms of the least
fix-point, thanks to the optimistic heuristic presented in Section 5.2.
6.2.2 Computing time
Figure 9 shows the main interesting computing times for the two case studies. The first
5Some classes even exist with different super-classes. In this case we just choose one, which is definitely
not safe.
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jar size analysis + pruning analysis pruning checking
midlets 11M 5m54 23% 77% 0m23
Soot 4.4M 3m40 17% 83% 0m11
Eclipse 96M 24m43 26% 74% 1m55
Figure 9: Computing time
column gives the size of the benchmarks (jar files). The second one shows the total time
taken by the complete stack map generation procedure (on the productor’s side). This
time is then divided into the analysis phase (third column) and the pruning phase (fourth
column). The last column correspond to the checking time (consumer’s side). Clearly, most
of the time is spent in pruning, but even this time remains acceptable (three to six times the
cost of the analysis), especially since this operation only needs to be performed once, by the
code producer. The checking time is short and could be further reduced with a reasonably
optimised implementation.
6.2.3 Increasing the proportion of ⊤v
Figure 10 estimates the size of witnesses before and after pruning, in terms of the proportion
proportion of non-⊤v in lfp pruned stack map ratio
midlets 44% 34% 77%
Soot 67% 42% 63%
Eclipse 58% 39% 66%
Figure 10: Number of non-⊤v values
of pairs p, x for which the value is not ⊤v. The last column shows the proportion of “posi-
tions” (of pairs p, x) that are kept with a non-⊤v value by pruning. We see that the “initial”
proportion of non-⊤v is greater in Soot and Eclipse, which indicates that objects (or arrays)
are used more often in Eclipse than in midlets (remember that base types are abstracted
by ⊤v). Also, the pruning removes more values in Soot and Eclipse than in midlets (which
is not surprising since there are more non-⊤v values to remove, in proportion). In the end,
the numbers of non-⊤v in the stack maps are very close for the three test cases.
6.2.4 Certificate size
The first four sub-columns of Figure 11 give the space saved by pruning, both for the class
witness fix-point pruned witness
representation extensive extensive sparse
format .class .jar .class .jar .class .jar
midlets 19.8% 7.3% 17.4% 6.8% 16.0% 7.0%
Soot 14.0% 7.2% 11.5% 6.5% 11.5% 7.3%
Eclipse 11.8% 3.3% 9.5% 3.0% 9.6% 3.2%
Figure 11: Size reduction by pruning and sparse representation
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files and the jar files (compressed archives). The numbers correspond to the difference in size
with respect to the same file format without stack map. For example, the total jar size for
Eclipse with pruned stack maps included is 3.0% greater than the original jar files (without
stack maps). In the two columns for the fix-point, since only conjunction-free witnesses can
be encoded in class files, we did not include any stack map for the methods whose least fix-
point had conjunctions (which is actually quite rare). Note that we can only underestimate
the benefit of pruning by doing this. We see that in the case of midlets, for example, the
size of the stack maps is reduced from 19.8% to 17.4% of the total initial class files, or from
7.3% to 6.8% of the initial jar files. Therefore there is no significant improvement here since
the size of what is shipped (i.e., the jar files with stack maps) is only reduced by less that
one percent.
The last two sub-columns of the figure show the effect of a sparse representation of the
stack maps obtained after pruning. We see that a sparse representation has little impact
on the size, and that the small savings that we get for (some) class files are canceled by the
compression phase, and tend to yeld larger jar files (even if the eight-bit alignment of the
class files is kept).
We have not tried to encode our stack maps with the new StackMapTable attribute
defined by JSR202, which is more complex and was designed to factorize most of the in-
formation. The results would probably be quite different since this format relies on the
assumption that the type of variables do not change too often, while the pruning may for
example set any variable to ⊤v even if it was not modified, as soon as the type information
for this variable is not needed anymore.
7 Related work
The formalisation of Java bytecode verification has received a lot of attention. We can only
point to a few relevant papers.
Java bytecode verification Freund and Mitchell [FM03] prove the soundness of a type
system for a very large subset of the Java bytecode with respect to a small-step operational
semantics (with explicit stacks). Their model of states is close to ours, but instrumented by
tags that keep track of the type of every value. They do not address the problem of inferring
types in presence of interfaces. A survey of bytecode verification techniques and solutions
to various known difficulties (interfaces, object initialisation, sub-routines) can be found in
[Ler03]. The concept of lightweight verification, which is now used in J2ME, was introduced
by Rose [Ros03]. Several algorithms were given, with enhancements that allow to reduce
the number of program points for which a stack map is necessary, more than what is done
in Sun’s lightweight bytecode verifier. The issue of verifying interfaces was not considered.
Using sets of types to verify interfaces Knoblock and Rehof [KR01] analyse an SSA
form of the Java bytecode in the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of the type hierarchy, and
they show that this minimal completion achieves an optimal precision, i.e., every program
typable in the power set completion is typable in the Dedekind-MacNeille completion. The
analysis presented in section 3 is therefore very similar to their work. Our representation of
the domain differ, though: we use conjunctions of types rather that disjunctions (in both
cases, upward/downward-closed sets are not represented in extension). The lattice that we
use to abstract values is close to the ideal completion of the type hierarchy (it is a super-
set of the ideal completion because the latter further requires that conjunctions be “not
empty”, in the sense that they must have a lower bound in the hierarchy). Furthermore,
Irisa
Computing stack maps with interfaces 35
our analysis only uses the subset of value♯ that is obtained by taking upper bounds of
atomic types, which is isomorphic to the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of type \{int}. See
[DP90] for an account on completion techniques for posets. Knoblock and Rehof do not prove
the correctness of their analysis with respect to a concrete semantics and safety property.
Qian [Qia99] proposes a type system for Java bytecode that uses arbitrary disjunctions of
reference types to allow the static verification of interfaces. Several safety properties are
proved for typable programs (type preservation, possible uses of uninitialized objects, of
sub-routines return addresses). The actual inference of types is not detailed. Push [Pus99]
has formalised a variant of Qian’s bytecode verifier in HOL and proved its correctness with
respect to a small-step operational semantics. Again, concrete values are tagged with their
type. Goldberg [Gol98] focuses on dynamic loading of classes and proposes a framework
for verifying Java class files out of order, while ensuring the global soundness of typing.
Class files are verified by a data-flow analysis that uses disjunctions of types (which solves
the problem of not knowing the type hierarchy) and yields the minimal set of ordering
constraints between types under which the class is type-safe. These constraints are added to
a global typing context that is transmitted across invocations of the verifier, and the global
safety is defined as the consistency of this context.
Pruning We have previously proposed a pruning algorithm for getting weaker abstract
interpretation witnesses [BJT07]. Such pruning algorithms were independently studied by
Seo, Yang, Yi and Han [SYYH07]. The problem that we consider here is different: the goal
is not to get a maximal witness in a given lattice, but to get a witness without conjunc-
tion, a property that is not monotone. Therefore, directly applying one of the algorithms
from [BJT07] would not necessarily help in getting such a witness. The backward compu-
tation that we proposed in the same work for distributive analyses (which is the case of the
bytecode verification) does not apply either, as shown in the introduction: the backward
algorithm performs greatest lower bound operations, which in the present setting introduce
conjunctions.
8 Conclusion
We have shown how the notion of pruning provides a viable means of integrating the verifi-
cation of interfaces into lightweight bytecode verification. This is achieved by combining an
extended bytecode analyser and an algorithm for removing conjunctions from the result of
the analysis which, together, allows to compute stack maps where interfaces are treated on
a par with other types.
The bytecode analysis that we have proposed here adds sets of types to the abstract
domain in order to verify interfaces. The ensuing pruning step optimises the typing found by
the analyser, reducing all such sets to a singleton, and removing as many typing information
as possible while still ensuring the memory safety, i.e., that all memory accesses will be to
existing fields of objects. The resulting stack maps can be checked without any overhead
compared to exisiting lightweight bytecode verification and will ensure statically the safety
of interface method calls. We also show that it is possible to simplify several aspects of the
BCV when constructing an abstract domain that is specific to the memory safety property.
In particular, there is no need to distinguish between base types and it is even possible to
identify these base type with the ⊤v element of the domain (which allows a program to use
an address as an integer).
In terms of semantic correctness, we have shown that it is possible to reason directly with
an untyped concrete semantics rather than a defensive virtual machine. Both techniques
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are equally sound, but the latter requires an additional abstraction step that explains the
link between the raw state model that we use and the tagged memory objects used inthe
instrumented semantics. In other words, we use a notion of state that is closer to the actual
implementation and, hence, more convincing. We made the reasoning modular by separating
the interprocedural aspect of the semantics and soundness proof. This allows us to cut the
double induction that arises from using a small-step semantics with big-step calls. In order
to complete the picture, the semantics with big-step calls that we used should be related to
a small-step semantics with a call stack, but we leave this for further work.
In terms of experiments, we have shown that the technique works well in practice, as we
could successfully analyse a large set of Java class files. Furthermore, the idea is not relevant
just for Java, but should apply to other object oriented languages with multiple inheritance,
since it only relies on the transformation of the poset representing a type hierarchy into
a lattice. The results show that it is feasible to compute efficiently conjunction-free stack
maps with interfaces ; however, they are disappointing in terms of reducing the stack map
size: even though a significant number of variables are set to ⊤v by pruning, this is not
enough for a sparse coding to be more efficient than a naive coding of stack maps, especially
as class files are eventually compressed.
As we said before, in this study we considered one aspect of the security of Java byte-
code, viz., the memory safety. Further work should extend the formalisation proposed here
to prove that for example access control properties are also ensured by the verifier. In an-
other direction, our stack map generator should be extended to produce stack maps in the
StacMapTable format proposed for Java.
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A Summary of definitions
Object oriented structure
C, I,m, f ∈ ident Java identifiers
C ∈ class ⊂ ident class names
I ∈ interface ⊂ ident interface names
t ∈ type ::= int | C | I | t [] types
super : class \ {Object} → class super-class
implements : class → P(interface) directly implemented
interfaces
extends : interface → P(interface) direct super-interfaces
ms ∈ msig ⊂ {t .m(t1, . . . , tn) | t 6= int} method signatures
arity : msig → N arity
result : msig → type return type
fs ∈ fsig ⊂ {C.f : t} field signatures
Attributes of the current method
x, y, z ∈ var local variables
arg ⊆ var formal parameters
targ : arg → type type of parameters
tret ∈ type return type
p ∈ ppoint = [0, |ppoint | − 1] program points
e ∈ expr ::= n n ∈ [−231, 231 − 1] | null expressions
| y + z | new C | y.fs | new t [y]
| y[z] | y.ms(x1, . . . , xarity(ms))
i ∈ instr ::= x := e | x.fs := y | x[y] := z instructions
| goto p | if x < y p | return x
code : ppoint → instr method code
Figure 12: Idealized Java bytecode
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values and states
v ∈ word 32-bit values
fields : class → P(fsig) transitive fields of a class
object ::= 〈C, o〉 o : fields(C)→ word objects
array ::= 〈t , a〉 a : [0, n− 1]→ word , n ≥ 0 arrays
h ∈ heap = word \ {0}⇀ (object ∪ array) heaps
alloc : heap ⇀ word \ {0} memory allocator
l ∈ var → word value of local variables
s ∈ state ::= 〈h, l , p〉 program states
typing
 ⊆ type × type subtyping order
· ⊢ · : · ⊆ heap × word × type dynamic typing
transition relations
→ ∈ bigstep = P
0
@[
n≥0
(heap × word × wordn)
×(heap × word ∪ {error})
1
A big-step relations
·
→ : msig → bigstep semantics of method calls
→ ⊆ state × (state ∪ heap × word ∪ {error}) small-step semantics
of the current method
Figure 13: Semantic definitions
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domain
v♯ ∈ value♯ ::= null | ⊤v abstract values
| t1 ∧ · · · ∧ tn n ≥ 1, ti ∈ type \ {int},
∀i, j ≤ n ti  tj =⇒ i = j
s♯ ∈ state♯ = var → value♯ abstract states
m ∈ map = ppoint → state♯ stack maps
s♯ ∈ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
= state♯ ∪ {⊥s,⊤s}
concretisation functions
γh , h ∈ heap : value
♯ → P(word ) for values
γp, p ∈ ppoint : state♯
⊤s
⊥s
→ P(state ∪ {error}) for states
γ :
(value♯ ∪ {⊤s})
→ P((heap × word) ∪ {error})
for return states
partial order
⊑v ⊆ value♯ × value♯ for values
⊑ ⊆ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
× state♯
⊤s
⊥s
for states
least upper bound
⊔v : value♯ × value♯ → value♯ for values
⊔ : state♯
⊤s
⊥s
× state♯
⊤s
⊥s
→ state♯
⊤s
⊥s
for states
abstract transition relations
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → state♯
⊤s
⊥s
) × ppoint
−→ ⊆ ppoint × (state♯ → value♯) method return
Figure 14: Abstract semantics
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body : msig ⇀ {(var , arg , ppoint , code)} code
·
→, (var , arg , ppoint , code)| {z }
−→ ∈ bigstep method execution
w.r.t.
·
→
lookup : (type \ {int})×msig ⇀ class resolution
·
→,ms| {z }
−→ ∈ bigstep signature invocation
w.r.t.
·
→
S : (msig → bigstep)→ (msig → bigstep)
= λ
·
→ .λms.
·
→,ms| {z }
−→
·
−→ : msig → bigstep interprocedural
= lfp(S) semantics
= λ
·
→ .
S
d≥0
``
Sd(λms ∈ msig.∅)
´
(ms)
´
Figure 15: Interprocedural layer. The variable
·
→ represents a function mapping signatures
to bigstep transition relations, i.e.,
·
→ : msig → bigstep.
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